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Abstract:  
Transformation of the management of traditional higher education institutions 
emerged  in  Hungary  following  the  change  of  the  political  system  in  1990, 
however, an appropriate answer has not been found to date. The first step in 
the  management  of  reform  is  identification  of  the  issues  that  need  to  be 
resolved through the implementation of changes.   
The present research has been aimed at identifying the present weaknesses 
of the inner management system of traditional Hungarian universities, thus 
find a solid starting point for reforming it. I conducted in-depth interviews in 
the  course  of  research,  with  10  top  university  managers  who  represent  9 
institutions,  thus  the  majority  of  traditional  Hungarian  universities.  Such  a 
research has not been made at least for the last decade. 
In  my  paper  first  I  present  the  current  legal  framework  of  the  system  of 
university management. Then I give an assessment of it on the basis of the 
interviews, analysing the deficiencies, the external and internal obstacles to 
efficient management  I  conclude  that  the  present  leaders  of  the 
universities  can  exactly  identify  those  deficiencies  of  the  system  and  the 
related external and internal circumstances that lead to disturbed operation 
and low efficiency. The results obtained through the interviews suggest that a 
reform of the internal management should rearrange intra-university power 
relations  and  harmonize  scopes  of  responsibility  and  competence.  A  shift 
toward  a  stronger  central,  rectoral  and  a  more  limited  faculty-  and  body-
related management appears necessary. 
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higher education reform, efficiency, centralization-decentralization 
 
Introduction 
Transformation  of  the 
management  of  higher  education  (HE) 
in general, and that of higher education 
institutions  (HEIs),  in  particular,  has 
been  on  the  agenda  in  Hungary  for  a 
long  time  now,  and  on  a  continuous 
basis.   Actually,  issues  related  to  the 
role  assumed  by  universities,  the 
relationship  between  the state and the 
universities,  and  internal  management 
of  the  institutions  have  recurred 
regularly since the foundation of the first 
university  of  the  country,  with  more  or 
less  appropriate  answers  given 
throughout  our  history,  depending  on 
the prevailing circumstances.   
The efficiency of higher education 
has become a key factor from the point 
of  view  of  competitiveness  among 
various  countries  and  also  different 
regions  as  a  result  of  a  globalizing 
educational  market,  increasing 
competition,  and  the  formation  of 
knowledge-based  societies.    That  is 
why the EU identified the modernization 
of  the  management  of  universities  a 
priority, and states in West Europe have 
dedicated  several  decades  to 
implementing  the  corresponding 
reforms,  mostly  on  the  basis  of 
introducing  a  system  of  university 
government.     
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That  issue  also  emerged  in 
Hungary  following  the  change  of  the 
political  system,  however,  an 
appropriate answer has not been found 
to date.  The law on higher education of 
1993  (LHE)  marked  considerable 
progress  in  a  number  of  areas, 
nevertheless,  it  failed  to  provide  a 
solution  to  the  problem  of  internal 
management  of  the  universities,  as 
required  by  the  recent  challenges  that 
have  to  be  faced.    A  number  of 
theoreticians  and  experts  in  practical 
implementation agree that the traditional 
management  system  brought  about  at 
that  time  is  incapable  of  efficiently 
operating  institutions  which  admit 
masses  of  students,  have  numerous 
faculties, and annually utilize budgets of 
billions  of  HUF.    In  2002,  the 
educational ministry specified as one of 
its  goals  the  transformation  of  the 
management  of  Hungarian  universities 
on  the  basis  of  a  governing  system.  
However,  the  initial  ideas  underwent 
considerable  changes  and  became 
distorted as a result of the resistance of 
the academic sphere, and, finally, even 
that less stringent concept failed to pass 
the constitutionality test.   
Consequently,  the  only  change 
that took place in the earlier system of 
internal  management  pursuant  to  the 
new  law  on  higher  education  adopted 
and enacted in 2006 was related to the 
setting up of what was called "Economic 
Councils"  (ECs).    However,  these 
bodies  are  authorized  to  provide 
consultation and opinion only, besides, 
some  of  their  members  come  from 
internal,  university  staff.    Thus  it 
appears very unlikely that they will ever 
be  able  to  bring  about  fundamental 
changes  in  either  the  management  or 
the  operation  of  the  universities.  
Hence, the earlier question still remains, 
and  now  it  comes  up  even  more 
sharply:  what  and  how  one  has  to,  or 
may, transform in the internal system of 
university management in order to make 
it more efficient and, as a result, have 
the institution operate more efficiently?  
Since  Hungary  must  face  the 
above  challenges  in  a  more  dramatic 
way  owing  to  so-called  congested 
development, the transformation of the 
management  of  universities  appears 
more than timely.  On the other hand, 
especially  following  the  failure  of  a 
reform  attempt,  chances  for  a  new 
initiative  to  succeed  require  more 
caution,  attention,  and  a  sound  basis.  
What is at stake in case no change is 
made  to  the  management  of  our 
traditional  and  famous  universities 
playing  a  crucial  role  in  Hungarian 
higher  education  is  that,  on  the  one 
hand, these institutions will fall behind in 
the  international  competition  in  the 
knowledge  market,  on  the  other  hand, 
they will fail to become engines driving 
knowledge-based  development  and 
catching  up  of  the  country  and  the 
region. 
 
Research  objectives  and 
methods 
The first step in the management 
of reform is identification  of the issues 
that  need  to  be  resolved  through  the 
implementation  of  changes.    The 
present  research  has  been  aimed  at 
identifying  the  present  weaknesses  of 
the  inner  management  system  of 
traditional  Hungarian  universities,  thus 
find a solid starting point for reforming it. 
  I conducted in-depth interviews 
in the course of research, during which I 
talked with 10 top university managers, 
including  3  deans,  1  vice-rector,  1 
college rector, and 5 university rectors.  
The managers interviewed represent 9 
HEIs,  3  based  in  Budapest  and  6 
located in other parts of the country.  To 
ensure  comparability  of  the  responses 












1.  The current legal framework 
of the system of university 
management 
The  currently  effective  Act  no. 
CXXXIX  of  2005  on  Higher  Education 
identifies  three  principal  actors  playing 
different  roles  in  the  management  of 
universities: 
￿  the  head  of  the  HEI  is  the 
rector; 
￿  the body making decisions and 
controlling  the  execution  thereof  is  the 
senate; 
￿  the  organ  taking  part  in  the 
preparation of strategic decisions and in 
the controlling of the execution of such 
decisions is the economic council (EC) 
(Article no.  20).   
Thus, a third actor, namely, the EC 
is  added  to  the  earlier  two  actors  (the 
rector and the university council [UC]).  
However, the scope of decision-making 
and  control  has  been  retained  by  the 
body  that  has  been  transformed  from 
the former UC, that is, the senate, while 
the  new  body,  the  EC,  has  been 
granted  only  rights  authorizing  it  to 
formulate opinions, take part in decision 
preparation  and  in  controlling  the 
execution of such decisions. 
 
The Rector 
It is evident from the specification 
of the rector's scope of liability (Article 
no.  29,  Sections  1  through  6)  that  the 
person  having  sole  liability  for  a 
university remains to be its rector.  As 
preconditions  for  appointing  a  rector, 
the  act  prescribes  experience  in 
operational  management,  organization, 
and financial management.  In principle, 
this  regulation  introduces  a  new  and 
important  criterion  for  the  appointment 
of rectors, whereas it fails to specify the 
method of implementation, therefore the 
realization  of  the  regulation  in  practice 
appears doubtful.  The law still requires 
that  the  rector  of  a  university  be  a 
university  professor  maintaining  an 
employment  or  legal  relation  with  the 
institution  concerned;  in  other  words, 
neither  ’external’  applicants  nor 
associate  professors  may  apply  for  a 
rector's position (Article 29, Section 7).  
A rector (and also a vice-rector, a 
dean,  a  financial  manager  and  a 
general secretary) may be appointed for 
a definite period of time ranging from 3 
to 5 years.  Also, a rector's (and also a 
vice-rector's and a dean's) commission 
may be extended on one occasion only, 
which  means  that  the  top  leader  of  a 
university (and that of a faculty, as well) 
may hold the given position at most for 
10  years,  while  his  re-election  on  the 
second  occasion  is  subject  to  a 
repeated  election  procedure.    The 
senate  elects  candidate  rectors  by  a 
majority of votes (Article 96, Sections 5 
through  7).    The  rector  is  then 
appointed,  upon  a  motion  of  the 
supervising ministry, by the President of 
the  Republic  of  Hungary  (Articles  100, 
115,  and  Section  2  of  Article  115).  
However, the supervising  ministry may 
only  reject  forwarding  the  decision  of 
the  senate  regarding  the  candidate 
rector to the President of the Republic 
of Hungary or the Prime Minister if the 
candidate  fails  to  meet  the  prescribed 
criteria,  or  the  senate  has  passed  its 
decision  contrary  to  the  relevant  legal 
provisions  (Section  3  of  Article  115).  
Hence, the ministry and the president of 
the  state  play  but  a  formal  role  in 
appointing  the  rector,  the  decision  is 
actually made exclusively by the senate. 
 
The Senate 
It is apparent from the list of tasks 
of the senate (Article 27, Section 1, 3-8) 
that  this  organ  is  entitled  to  pass 
decisions in all issues connected to the 
academic  activity,  the  development, 
operation,  financial  management,  and 
human  resources  management  of  the 
university.    That  is,  while  the  rector 
assumes  responsibility  for  nearly  all 
issues  related  to  the  university,  the 
senate enjoys a similarly wide decision-
making  competence.    As  regards  the 
responsibility of the senate, the law sets   77   
 
forth just one requirement: while making 
decisions,  the  senate  must  take  into 
consideration  the  requirement  of 
efficient  and  responsible  use  and 
appropriate utilization of public moneys 
and public assets, and adhere to the ad 
valorem  principle  (Article  27,  Section 
15). 
Although  the  act  determines  that 
members  are  to  be  appointed  to  the 
senate  on  the  basis  of  elections,  it 
defines  limits  only  as  to  their  number 
and composition: 
￿  a  senate  may  not  comprise 
fewer than seven or nine members;  
￿  the  members  elected  by 
instructors  and  researchers  must 
constitute a majority of the members of 
a senate;  
￿  the  number  of  each  of  the 
members  representing  non-academic 
staff  and  those  of  the  representative 
trade unions must not be lower than five 
percent,  or  at  least  one  person  each 
(Article 28, Section 1);  
￿  the self-government of students 
may delegate members representing at 
least one-fourth and at most one-third of 
the  overall  members  of  the  senate 
(Article 78, Section 4).   
In  other  words,  the  act  does  not 
specify  faculty-based  representation 
and  bodies  comprising  30-40-50 
members.   
The  students  are  entitled  to  the 
right of consent in issues pertaining to 
study and examination regulations, the 
rules  of  reimbursement  and 
remuneration,  and  the  procedure  of 
providing  student  opinion  on  the 
instructors' work (Article 78,  Section 1).  
That is, the students have a right of veto 
regarding the senate's decision in these 
matters,  and  the  minimum  student 
representation  ratio  of  25%  grants  a 
rather  large  share  of  votes  in  the 
senate. 
 
The Economic Council  
According to the act, the EC plays 
a  consultant-proposer-participant  role 
regarding the operation of the university 
(Article 23, Section 1), which it fulfils by 
providing its opinion in issues related to 
financial management and development 
(Article  25,  Section  1).    The  EC  has 
been  assigned  specific  decision 
authorization  exclusively  in  connection 
with  the  alienation  or  encumbrance  of 
treasury assets maintained by the given 
HEI (Article 23, Section 1), with actual 
control  restricted  to  financial 
management  of  the  university  (Article 
25,  Section  2).    Thus,  at  present,  the 
role of the EC is predominantly limited 
to  protecting  state  assets  and  public 
moneys.   
The act defines the composition of 
the EC in a straightforward manner:  
￿  the number of members is 7 in 
case  the  number  of  students  is  below 
15,000,  and  9  members  above  that 
number; 
￿  3 or 4 members are appointed 
by  the  senate  (1  member  to  be 
appointed by the students), and 2 or 3 
members are appointed by the minister; 
￿  the  rector  and  the  financial 
manager  are  members  of  the  EC  ex 
officio (Article 23, Sections 4 & 5). 
That  is,  the  university  enjoys 
strong  predominance  in  the  EC:  5 
members out of 7, or 7 members out of 
9 members.  The act specifies in detail 
issues related to incompatibility through 
exclusion  of  persons  tied  first  of  all  to 
politics, the government or some other 
HEI (Article 23, Section 7).   
 
2.  Assessment of the current 
system of university management 
The first step in the management 
of reform is identification  of the issues 
that  need  to  be  resolved  through  the 
implementation  of  changes.    That 
provides  a  basis  for  specifying  the 
desired target state, the road leading to 
that state and the means to be applied, 
and  the  outcome  of  a  change  can  be 
measured against these factors.  For a 
university  management  reform  to 
succeed, to attain results, and to attract 
support  from  university  leaders  in 
Hungary, it is vital to provide solutions   78   
 
to  actual  problems  perceived  by  the 
management of the university itself.  In 
what  follows,  I  will  present  the  results 
attained during the in-depth interviews. 
 
2.1.  Deficiencies  of  the  current 
internal  system  of  university 
management 
The  HE  managers  interviewed 
assigned an average score of 2.9 to the 
current  internal  system  of  university 
management  on  a  scale  of  1  to  5.  
Neither  of  the  scores  was  higher  than 
3.5,  and  several  responders  gave  a 
satisfactory  score  (around  2)  only 
(indicating  thereby  that  all  of  them 
considered  a  need  for  a  change 
justified).   
It is worth noting that the majority 
(7)  of  the  respondents  considered  the 
same element to be the most important 
deficiency  of  the  current  system:  the 
contradictory  relations  between  the 
scope of competence and responsibility, 
the  decision-makers  and  the  leaders, 
the rector and the deans, the university 
and the faculties.   
• the  controversy  between 
collective  decision-making  versus  one-
man liability 
As  3  of  the  rectors  put  it  using 
almost  identical  words:  the  biggest 
problem  lies  in  the  fact  that  the 
decisions are made either by the senate 
or by the faculties and faculty leaders, 
whereas final responsibility and related 
risks are assumed by the rector who is 
at  their  mercy  (in  financial  issues,  this 
responsibility is shared with the financial 
manager).  The major controversy in the 
current  internal  system  of  university 
management  is  between  democratic, 
collective  decision-making,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  one-man  liability,  on  the 
other.   
•  university  interests  –  faculty 
interests 
Importantly,  two  deans  and  a 
rector  identified  the  discrepancy 
between  faculty  and  university 
objectives  as  the  major  controversy  in 
the current internal system of university 
management. They noted that a system 
of  decision-making  reflecting  the 
philosophy where it is not the university 
that has faculties but the faculties have 
a  university  is  unsuitable  for  realizing 
overall  university  objectives  and 
represent  all-university  interests.  The 
faculties  are  too  powerful  and  capable 
of  preventing  strategically  important 
measures  through  mainstreaming  their 
partial  interests.    The  given  system 
considerably  reduces  the  room  left  for 
manoeuvring  for  the  university 
management,  and  forces  deans  in  the 
senate into a „schizophrenic” behaviour 
which  compels  them  to  take  into 
consideration  the  not  infrequently 
contradictory  interests  of  their  own 
faculty and those of the university at the 
same time.  Another rector pointed out 
that the university is required to fulfil a 
large  number  of  tasks  centrally 
(administration,  budget  management, 
projects,  regulations,  etc).    However, 
the management of the university is at 
the mercy of the faculties in this area as 
well.    This  may  be  illustrated  by  the 
obligation  to  accumulate  remainder 
budgetary  amounts  at  year-end,  the 
responsibility  for  which  is  assigned  by 
the  ministry  to  the  rector,  whereas 
remainder amounts are to be created in 
faculty budgets/finances. 
•  lack of real integration  
According  to  one  of  the  rectors, 
real  integration  still  has  not  been 
implemented (the earlier Soviet system 
of  fragmented  HE  institutions  was 
replaced  by  multi-faculty,  integrated, 
regionally  organized  universities  on 
January  01,  2000);  faculty  selfishness 
and lack of cooperation are manifest − 
albeit  partly  as  a  result  of  financial 
constraints −, thus parallel mechanisms 
and considerable economic irrationality 
have  been  preserved.    The  level  of 
education and research is also affected 
owing to the fact that the students are 
taught not by those most suited for the 
task, and there is a lack of cooperation 
even  between  faculties  carrying  out 
research in identical scientific fields.  As   79   
 
a  result,  an  optimum  condition  is  not 
reached  at  the  university  level  either 
financially, or professionally. 
•  carry-over  of    earlier  power 
relations 
  A rector and a dean pointed out 
that  management  elections  appear  to 
reflect  earlier  power  relations  even 
today,  in  the  eight  year  after  the 
integration.    In  some  institutions,  the 
faculties that used to comprise one and 
the same institution are now large and 
powerful, capable of „appropriating” the 
rector's  position,  the  vice-rector 
positions and, hence, the management 
of the university.  (The respondents also 
maintain  the  view  that  whereas  the 
election  of  the  rector  is  formally 
democratic,  in  fact,  there  are 
background bargains and, even worse, 
personal  interconnections  that 
determine the outcome; see later).  The 
old  and  large  faculties  view  the 
newcomers as competitors, and tend to 
reject initiatives proposed by such new 
faculties. 
In addition to the above problems 
experienced  by  the  majority  of  the 
respondents,  the  following  deficiencies 
of  the  current  system  were  noted  by 
university  leaders:  lack  of  professional 
management; insufficient horizontal and 
vertical communication, as well as flow 
of  information;  slow  rate  of  decision-
making; over-regulation. 
 
2.2.  Obstacles  to  efficient 
management 
a) external factors: 
The  series  of  in-depth  interviews 
allows  us  to  clearly  conclude  that 
Hungarian  HEI  managers  experience 
very  similar  obstacles  that  hinder 
efficient  management.    There  are  a 
number  of  external  factors  mentioned 
by almost all respondents.  (An external 
factor  is  one  that  is  a  part  of  the  HE 
system of management, and is thus not 
under direct control of the university.) 
The  hindering  factor  most 
frequently  referred  to  by  top  university 
managers  (six  leaders)  has  to  do  with 
the  inability  to  perform  long-term 
strategic  planning  and  management  in 
present-day Hungarian institutions.  The 
external  reason  is  associated  with  the 
frequent  changes  in  legal  regulations, 
first  of  all  those  of  the  LHE,  although 
other „rules of the game” (for example, 
in  the  specification  of  admission  score 
limits) having an ad-hoc, unpredictable 
character  also  have  their  negative 
impact.  HEIs and their managers have 
no  chance  to  get  prepared  for  these 
changes,  and  as  soon  as  they 
subsequently  manage  to  adapt  to  a 
change, they are to face the next one in 
no time. 
As  far  as  financial  opportunities 
are concerned, it should be noted that 
only  one  manager  complained  of  the 
constantly decreasing amount of central 
funds  as  an  obstacle  to  efficient 
management.  On the other hand, six of 
the  respondents  complained  about  the 
unpredictability  of  financial 
opportunities.    The  fact  that  one  can 
perform  calculations  regarding  the 
expected funds for a period of maximum 
one  year  because  the  method  and 
amount of financing constantly undergo 
changes,  and  budgetary  limits  are 
modified  even  during  a  year 
(accumulation  of  remainder  amounts, 
freezing,  changes  in  the  financing  of 
patient care, etc.), also makes strategic 
planning  impossible  and  forces  the 
institutions to manage funds on a day-
to-day  basis,  as  well  as  makes 
managers to apply improvised solutions. 
A  remarkable  uniformity  of 
opinions of the managers is noted also 
regarding the issues connected to HRM.  
Five of the institution leaders mentioned 
the public servant system as an external 
obstacle to more efficient management.  
On the one hand, the system prevents 
the institutions from "getting rid" of the 
low-performing  instructors  and  other 
employees relatively easily, on the other 
hand,  it  does  not  allow  them  to 
recognize the output of those excelling 
in their work, not to mention the lack of 
available funds for that purpose.   80   
 
Aside  from  the  above  problem 
noted  by  several  respondents,  one  of 
the  institutional  managers  complained 
about the lack of freedom in managing 
material  assets  more  flexibly,  one  of 
them referred to an ever increasing and 
not  always  ethical  competition  among 
the  HEIs,  and  another  pointed  out  the 
lack  of  labour  market  indicators  as  an 
external  obstacle  to  more  efficient 
management.     
 
b) internal factors: 
Respondents appeared to provide 
largely  similar  opinions  regarding  the 
internal  obstacles  to  more  efficient 
management.  (An internal factor is one 
that is integral to the internal system of 
university  management  and,  as  such, 
could  be  changed  by  the  university 
itself.)  6  of  the  managers  are  mostly 
hindered in efficient management by the 
fact  that  the  senate,  the  faculties,  and 
even the community of instructors may, 
and  actually  do,  preclude  managerial 
initiatives  that  are  contrary  to  their 
immediate  interests.    As  a  result,  the 
managers  are  actually  prevented  from 
carrying  out  any  reforms,  structural 
reorganization,  and,  quite  frequently, 
even  simple,  operative  modification.  
The situation was evaluated similarly by 
the  manager  who  complained  that  his 
institution  was  reluctant  to  „modernize 
itself”  and  apply  advanced  methods  in 
such  areas  as  marketing,  PR, 
communication,  and  HRM.    The 
apparatus appears to lack both an intent 
and  the  required  expertise  to 
accomplish that. 
Three managers identified as their 
most  important  problem  the  fact  that 
they  could  not  rely  on  their  peer 
managers  to  the  extent  that  would  be 
desirable.    In  one  case,  this  is  due  to 
the fact that it is impossible to take into 
consideration  exclusively  or 
predominantly  professional  and 
individual  qualities  when  appointing 
vice-rectors.  In fact, the old and large 
faculties  insist  that  they  provide  the 
vice-rectors  and,  in  some  cases,  they 
do  even  appoint  particular  persons  for 
these positions.  The same respondent 
also  pointed  out  the  contradiction  that 
exists  in  terms  of  the  rector's 
dependence upon the deans with whom 
he  is  required  to  cooperate  closely, 
whereas  he has no  word  in electing  a 
dean  for  one  faculty  or  another.  
Another  rector's  vice-rectors  are 
appropriate  from  both  a  professional 
and a personal point of view, however, 
they cannot/do not want to dedicate the 
necessary  time  and  effort  required  by 
the  given  assignment.    The  manager 
concerned thinks that a daily period of 
four hours is insufficient for a vice-rector 
to do his job, whereas his vice-rectors 
perform their work only as „fourth shift” 
managers.    A  third  rector  found 
managerial experience missing from his 
peer managers. 
A factor seen by the respondents 
as  working  against  efficient 
management  is  related  to  complicated 
decision  mechanisms  which  tend  to 
force  managers  to  make  compromises 
on a continuous basis, on the one hand, 
and  deprive  them  of  their  time  and 
energy  that  should  be  spent  on  more 
important,  strategic  or  operative  tasks, 
on the other hand.  
 
2.3.  Experience gained so far in 
the area of operation of the ECs 
The  series  of  in-depth  interviews 
clearly  indicates  a  diversity  of  the 
assessments  made  by  the  various 
managers regarding the operation of the 
ECs to date.  Four of the respondents 
have  formulated  a  definitely  positive 
opinion;  they  find  ECs  a  useful, 
successfully  operating  entity.    Four 
other  managers,  on  the  other  hand, 
consider  the  existence  of  ECs 
unjustified,  and  they  think  they  do  not 
operate  properly.    Two  of  the 
respondents  suppose  that  the  EC  as 
such operates well but, due to a lack of 
power,  inefficiently.    It  is  interesting  to 
note  that  managers  at  different  levels 
within one and the same institution tend 
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differently.  In general, however, rectors 
appear  to  evaluate  ECs  as  a  useful 
body, contrary to deans who find them 
useless.   
The  managers  sharing  a  positive 
opinion of the ECs have pointed out the 
following  aspects:  the  ECs  come  up 
with  good  ideas,  ensure  external 
control, approach university issues with 
due  responsibility,  represent  an 
unbiased external opinion, and maintain 
a rationalistic approach.  Those taking a 
clearly  opposite  position  regarding  the 
ECs  maintain  a  contrary  view:  the 
members are unprepared, insufficiently 
trained,  undedicated,  formulate  their 
opinions  in  an  ad  hoc  manner,  are 
affected  by  political  considerations, 
while  the  members  are  too  busy  and 
have no time for such activities, and do 
not grasp or understand the operation of 
universities.  As one of the rectors put it, 
external  EC  members  come  from  the 
sphere  of  professional  and  personal 
acquaintances  of  the  minister,  and 
function at the university as supervisors 
delegated by the ministry.  Those who 
find that the ECs operate well also note 
that  they  have  no  power  to  influence 
decisions.    In  their  opinion,  the  ECS 
pass  appropriate  decisions  in  certain 
issues,  however,  they  get  rejected  by 
the  senate.    This  argument  may,  for 
example,  be  illustrated  by  rector 
elections  at  a  university:  the  EC 
identified  the  best  candidate  on  the 
basis of an objective system of scores, 
however,  the  senate  chose  someone 
else for a rector.  These managers are 
also  afraid  that  the  respected  experts 
comprising the ECs may withdraw from 
their  position  if  they  find  that  they  are 
unable to influence the way things take 
shape  at  the  universities  and  find 
themselves  in  a  „neither  money,  nor 
fame”  situation,  and  thus  the  ECs 
„become empty.”  
Of  course,  those  of  the 
respondents  who  have  formulated 
clearly  positive  opinions  about  the 
operation  heretofore  also  support  the 
idea  of  assigning  a  higher  level  of 
competence to the ECs than they enjoy 
today and transforming them as a part 
of  the  governing  system  of  the 
university  into  managing  authorities 
(MAs).    The  ECs  would  then  be 
responsible  for  electing  the  rector, 
preparing  the  institutional  budget,  and 
passing  decisions  involving 
organizational  restructuring.    On  the 
other  hand,  those  of  the  respondents 
who  have  formulated  an  unfavourable 
opinion  think  a  larger  scope  of 
competence  of  the  ECs  would  have 
tragic, dangerous consequences.  They 
argue  that  the  election  of  members 
should  be  based  on  totally  different 
grounds,  providing  that  the  ministry 
wants to create MAs with real authority.  
In  such  an  event,  members  should  be 
elected  from  a  much  wider  scope  of 
candidates,  in  an  open  way,  through 
national  or  international  application 
procedures,  and  on  the  basis  of 
objective  criteria  and  strict 
incompatibility rules so as to ensure that 
external  members  do  not  represent 
political  interests  or  the  interests  of 
another  institution.    One  of  the 
managers  argued  that  these  tasks 
should  be  accomplished  by  external 
individuals  who  are  demonstrably 
connected to the university in one way 
or another.  Doubts regarding the ability 
of  the  governing  system  to  function  in 
Hungary  were  pointed out in this case 
as well, questioning whether there was 
a  sufficient  amount  of  persons  in 
Hungary capable of filling the positions 
of university MAs. 
 
2.4.    Elements  to  be  preserved 
from the existing system 
It should be noted that hardly any 
of  the  responding  university  managers 
mentioned  a  principal  or  practical 
element of the current internal system of 
university  management  that  should 
definitely be retained or left unchanged.  
Two of them definitely noted that „there 
are no taboos”.  Among the elements to 
be preserved, the freedom of research 
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academic  autonomy),  the  decisions 
passed  on  the  basis  of  collective 
wisdom  in  scientific  issues,  the 
independence  from  actual  politics, 
taking  the  instructors'  opinion  into 
consideration,  and  a  certain  degree  of 
independence  of  the  faculties  and 
institutes were mentioned by the rest of 
the  managers.  The  responses  clearly 
indicated  that  the  managers  are  fully 
aware  of  the  limitations  of  autonomy; 
they  consider  the  freedom  of  research 
and education worth preserving only on 
condition that autonomous research and 
education  serve  clearly  identified 
objectives  and  follow  well-defined 
strategic directions.  Two of the rectors 
argued  that  academic  freedom  should 
not  be  taken  to  mean  „Let  a  hundred 
flowers bloom, that is, let everyone do 
whatever he or she wants to”. 
 
     Consequences, recommendations 
As  a  starting  point  for  future 
reforms,  actual  dysfunctions  of 
operation  of  the  current  system  of 
management  should  be  taken  into 
consideration.    The  present  leaders  of 
the  universities  can  exactly  identify 
those deficiencies of the system and the 
related  external  and  internal 
circumstances  that  lead  to  disturbed 
operation  and  low  efficiency.    The 
outcome and successful implementation 
of  the  reform  essentially  depend  on 
whether these problems are resolved.  If 
no remedy is provided for the diseases 
of the present system, then the reform 
will fail to meet its objective and to gain 
the  support  of  its  major  actors  —  the 
managers.   
The  results  obtained  through  in-
depth interviews suggest that a reform 
of  the  internal  management  should 
rearrange  intra-university  power 
relations  and  harmonize  scopes  of 
responsibility and competence.  A shift 
toward a stronger central, rectoral and a 
more  limited  faculty-  and  body-related 
management appears necessary.    
Inclusion of external control in the 
operation  of  universities  appears 
necessary  regardless  of  a  governing 
system.    Doubts  concerning  the  ECs 
(narrow scope of pool, risk of personal 
or  political  interconnections,  lack  of 
expertise  or  dedication,  etc.)  suggest 
that a body-based, technocratic solution 
should  be  preferred  over  a  person-
orientated  one.      A  national  body 
consisting, in part or in full, of members 
external to universities (the educational 
government, the business sphere, non-
profit  organizations)  could  be 
established (in a way similar most of all 
to  American  state-level  boards), 
supplemented  for  each  university  by  a 
representative  of  the  local  community 
on an individual basis.  That body would 
provide  preliminary  opinion  on  the 
institution  development  plans  of  the 
universities, and subsequently evaluate 
the  rate  of  completion  of  the  tasks 
undertaken  in  the  performance 
contracts.  Through  making  its  reports 
public,  the  body  would  promote  real 
competition among the HEIs and serve 
as  a  basis  for  the  division  of  the 
numbers  of  admissible  students  and 
also  the  resources  based  on 
performance. However, members to the 
body  should  be  selected  with  extreme 
care and be prepared to fulfil their tasks 
through  attending  preparatory  and 
adjustment  programmes.  That  body 
could  serve  later  on  as  a  basis  for 
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